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Abstract	  	  Just	   when	   it	   seemed	   like	   sovereign	   default	   was	   a	   virtual	   impossibility	   in	   the	  developed	  world,	   the	   turmoil	   in	  sovereign	  debt	  markets	   triggered	  by	  explosive	  debt	   growth	   in	   the	   wake	   of	   the	   financial	   crisis	   raised	   new	   fears	   about	   fiscal	  prospects	   in	  many	  advanced	  economies.	  However,	  assessing	  the	  severity	  of	   the	  situation	   is	   complicated	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   no	   definitive	   empirical	   or	   theoretical	  benchmark	   exists	   for	   sovereign	   solvency.	   This	   paper	   reviews	   the	   literature	   on	  solvency,	  sustainability	  and	  default	  as	  well	  as	  recent	  expert	  contributions	  about	  the	  severity	  of	  the	  present	  fiscal	  situation	  in	  the	  developed	  world	  and	  finds	  that	  the	  difficulties	  involved	  in	  determining	  the	  dangers	  entailed	  in	  outstanding	  debt	  include	   not	   only	   the	   need	   to	   deal	   with	   economic	   uncertainty	   surrounding	   the	  
ability	  of	  the	  given	  sovereign	  to	  pay,	  but	  also	  –	  and	  the	  paper	  argues	  in	  the	  case	  of	   developed	   countries	   more	   importantly	   –	   gauging	   the	   political	   context	  determining	   the	  willingness	   of	   the	   sovereign	   to	   service	  debt.	   It	   then	  goes	  on	   to	  explore	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  markets	  gauge	  this	  degree	  of	  willingness,	  using	  rating	  agencies’	   sovereign	   rating	  methodologies	   as	   a	   proxy	   for	  markets’	   approach	   to	  creditworthiness	  and	  quoting	  examples	  of	  ratings	  changes	  in	  the	  recent	  past	  to	  see	   to	   what	   degree	   the	   considerations	   listed	   in	   the	   rating	   methodologies	   are	  applied	   in	   practice.	   It	   concludes	   that	   increased	   nervousness	   about	   sovereign	  default	  might	   lead	  to	  a	  more	   intrusive	   influence	  by	  market	  actors	  on	  a	  broader	  range	  of	  policy	  and	  institutional	  issues	  in	  developed	  countries	  than	  before.	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Introduction	  	  “How	   close	   is	   America	   to	   fiscal	   crisis?”	   asked	   The	   Economist	   ten	   Economics	  professors	  and	  practitioners	  earlier	   this	  month2.	   If	   the	  question-­‐setting	  betrays	  the	   gloomy	   mood	   that	   beset	   many	   developed	   countries	   in	   the	   midst	   of	   the	  economic	   downturn	   and	   in	   the	   face	   of	   Greece’s	   and	   Ireland’s	   debt	   crises,	   the	  array	  of	  answers	  given	  by	  the	  respondents	  –	  ranging	  from	  “America	  is	  bankrupt”	  to	   “There	   is	   no	   fundamental	   deficit	   crisis”	   –	   speaks	   even	   more	   clearly	   of	   the	  scope	   for	   divergence	   of	   opinion	   of	   policy	   experts	   about	   the	   seriousness	   of	   the	  situation	  and,	  accordingly,	  about	  the	  best	  ways	  out	  of	  the	  present	  predicament.	  Given	   the	   recentness	   of	   the	   awakening	   from	   the	   illusion	   that	   prosperous	  developed	  countries	  do	  not	  fall	  victim	  to	  sovereign	  debt	  crises,	  the	  gloom	  is	  not	  surprising,	  but	   the	  wide	  scope	   for	  disagreement	  about	   the	   fiscal	  position	  bears	  explaining.	  Why	  is	  it	  so	  difficult	  to	  tell	  if	  a	  fiscal	  crisis	  is	  likely	  or	  not?	  How	  much	  debt	   is	   too	   much?	   At	   what	   levels	   of	   public	   indebtedness	   should	   one	   start	   to	  worry	  about	  markets	  getting	  cold	   feet	  and	  denying	   the	  state	   further	   financing?	  How	  do	  we	  know	  when	  times	  are	  so	  desperate	  that	  desperately	  painful	  measures	  are	  warranted	  to	  avert	  a	  meltdown?	  	  This	  paper	  reviews	  the	  literature	  on	  default,	  solvency	  and	  sustainability	  as	  well	  as	  recent	  expert	  contributions	  about	  the	  severity	  of	  the	  present	  fiscal	  situation	  in	  the	  developed	  world	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  reasons	  for	  the	  lack	  of	  empirical	  or	  theoretical	   benchmarks	   for	   solvency	   and	   the	   numerous	   economic	   and	  political	  aspects	  involved	  in	  determining	  a	  country’s	  creditworthiness	  at	  a	  given	  level	  of	  indebtedness.	   It	   finds	   that	   in	   the	  case	  of	  developed	  countries,	   the	  uncertainties	  regarding	  the	  willingness	  of	  the	  given	  sovereign	  to	  service	  its	  debt	  on	  time	  and	  in	  full	   –	   or	   in	   other	   words	   the	   likelihood	   of	   a	   given	   polity	   to	   make	   and	   enforce	  decisions	   needed	   to	   set	   aside	   the	   necessary	   resources	   for	   debt	   service	   –	   place	  stronger	   constraints	   on	   the	   debt	   carrying	   capacity	   of	   the	   sovereign	   than	   its	  
ability	  to	  pay	  –	  determined	  by	  the	  income	  generated	  by	  its	  economy.	  Therefore,	  the	   lack	   of	   a	   reliable	   method	   for	   benchmarking	   is	   not	   so	   much	   due	   to	   the	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difficulties	   involved	   in	   economic	   forecasting	   but	   due	   to	   the	   uncertainties	  involved	  in	  gauging	  the	  market’s	  perceptions	  about	  the	  political	  constraints	  and	  incentives	  guiding	  future	  governments	  in	  their	  decisions	  to	  repay	  or	  to	  default.	  	  The	  paper	  then	  enumerates	  a	  range	  of	  possible	  approaches	  creditors	  could	  take	  in	  assessing	  the	  political	  risks	  to	  repayment,	  compares	  and	  contrasts	  these	  with	  the	   criteria	   discussed	   in	   the	   rating	   methodologies	   of	   the	   three	   large	   agencies	  issuing	  sovereign	  ratings	  and	  uses	  anecdotal	  evidence	  to	  see	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  agencies	  have	  applied	  any	  of	  these	  considerations	  in	  their	  recent	  rating	  decisions	  concerning	   developed	   countries.	   It	   concludes	   from	   this	   exercise	   that	   the	  appraisal	  of	  the	  willingness	  to	  pay	  seems	  to	  be	  based	  on	  a	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  of	  default	  for	  the	  country	  as	  a	  whole,	  on	  the	  country’s	  track	  record	  of	  fiscal	  policy,	  the	   presence	   of	   a	   willingness	   to	   undergo	   painful	   measures	   in	   order	   to	   signal	  readiness	  for	  sacrifices	  and	  adjustment	  and	  on	  the	  general	  political	  environment	  in	   the	   country,	   such	  as	   the	  degree	   to	  which	  political	   and	  economic	   institutions	  conform	   to	   the	   ideals	   of	   democracy	   and	  market-­‐economy,	   the	   level	   of	   political	  stability	  and	  consensus,	   the	  country’s	  policy	  choices	   in	  non-­‐fiscal	  areas	  and	  the	  relationship	  of	  the	  country	  with	  international	  financial	  institutions.	  It	  concludes	  by	   asking	   whether	   Mosley’s	   earlier	   finding	   that	   financial	   markets	   exercise	  “strong	   but	   narrow”	   control3	   over	   developed	   countries’	   policy	   choices	   might	  become	   a	   thing	   of	   the	   past	   in	   light	   of	   the	   new-­‐found	   worries	   about	  creditworthiness,	   if	   rating	   agencies	   are	   induced	   to	   comment	   on	   and	   act	   upon	  developments	  in	  the	  broader	  political	  and	  policy	  scene	  of	  debtor	  countries.	  	  
The	  problems	  of	  gauging	  creditworthiness	  	  In	  the	  turmoil	  of	  the	  past	  year,	  amidst	  all	  the	  talk	  about	  contagion,	  loss	  of	  market	  confidence	   and	   rescue	   packages,	   there	   was	   little	   mention	   of	   how	   little	   is	  empirically	  known	  about	  the	  capacity	  of	  mature	  economies	  to	  carry	  public	  debt	  without	   the	   risk	   of	   losing	   creditworthiness	   and	   suddenly	   being	   shut	   out	   of	  financial	  markets.	  Since	  no	  developed	  economy	  had	  been	  involved	  in	  debt	  crises	  since	   the	  war	  before	  events	  got	  out	  of	  hand	   in	  Greece	   last	   spring,	  no	  empirical	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experience	   had	   been	   available	   for	   predicting	   when	   markets	   would	   become	  uneasy	   about	   providing	   further	   financing	   for	   a	   developed	   sovereign.	   Several	  studies	  investigated	  the	  triggers	  for	  debt	  crises	  in	  developing	  countries,	  but	  the	  findings	  of	  these	  are	  not	  readily	  applicable	  to	  developed	  economies.	  They	  point	  to	   the	   importance	   of	   risky	   financing	   structures	   –	   short	   maturities	   and	  predominantly	   foreign	  denomination	   of	   the	   outstanding	  debt	   –	   and	   to	   adverse	  country-­‐specific	   factors,	   especially	   a	   history	   of	   defaults,	   but	   also	   political,	  economic	  and	  policy	  uncertainty	  in	  driving	  debt	  crises,	  and	  they	  emphasize	  that	  “fiscal	   fundamentals”	   in	   themselves	   turn	   out	   not	   to	   be	   a	   good	   predictor	   of	  default4.	  Since	  developed	  countries	  have	  been	  default-­‐free	  since	  the	  war	  and	  are	  considered	   stable	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   political	   and	   economic	   conditions,	   they	   are	  arguably	   free	   of	   the	   specific	   risk	   factors	   that	   make	   borrowing	   dangerous	   for	  many	  developing	   countries.	   Furthermore,	   they	   tend	   to	   be	   able	   to	   finance	   their	  debt	   via	   instruments	   denominated	   in	   their	   domestic	   currencies	   and	  characterized	  by	  long	  maturities	  and	  a	  low	  share	  of	  indexed	  debt,	  limiting	  risks	  to	   public	   finances	   from	   sudden	   changes	   in	   interest	   and	   exchange	   rates5.	  Therefore,	  existing	  empirical	  evidence	  –	  confounded	  by	   these	  extra	  constraints	  on	  debt	  carrying	  capacity	  –	  cannot	  be	  extended	  to	  them.	  	  Unfortunately,	   the	   absence	   of	   empirical	   clues	   for	   judging	   the	   riskiness	   of	  countries’	   debt	   position	   is	   compounded	   by	   the	   inability	   of	   theory	   to	   provide	  practical	  guidance.	  Theoretically,	  access	  to	  credit	  markets	  is	  predicated	  upon	  the	  sovereign’s	  ability	  to	  retain	  its	  creditworthiness,	  or	  in	  other	  words	  its	  ability	  to	  credibly	  commit	  itself	  to	  generate	  the	  necessary	  funds	  in	  the	  future	  –	  by	  running	  primary	  surpluses	  –	  to	  service	  debt	  on	  time	  and	  in	  full6.	  Therefore,	  the	  maximum	  debt	   that	   a	   sovereign	   can	   amass	   without	   losing	   its	   creditworthiness	   needs	   to	  preserve	   the	   sovereign’s	   solvency,	   i.e.	   the	   balance	   between	   long-­‐term	   debt	  service	  and	  long-­‐term	  primary	  surpluses7.	  Since	  the	  former	  is	  determined	  by	  the	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  Detriagache	  and	   Spilimbergo	   (2001),	   Manasse	   et	   al.	   (2003)	   and	   Krueger	   and	   Messmacher	   (2004),	   on	   the	  country	  specific	  effects	  contributing	  to	  “debt	  intolerance”	  –	  i.e.	  the	  incapacity	  to	  carry	  substantial	  amount	  of	  debt	  –	  see	  Reinhart	  et	  al.	  (2003)	  and	  Manasse	  and	  Roubini	  (2005).	  5	  Cottarelli	  et	  al.	  (2010).	  6	  Chalk	  and	  Hemming	  (2000).	  	  7	  Chalk	  and	  Hemming	  (2000),	  Roubini	  (2001),	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outstanding	   stock	   of	   debt	   and	   long-­‐term	   interest	   rates,	  whereas	   the	   latter	   is	   a	  function	  of	   the	  size	  of	   the	  gross	  domestic	  product	  and	  the	  proportion	  of	   it	   that	  the	   government	  will	   appropriate	   for	  paying	   its	   interest	   bill,	   the	  maximum	  safe	  level	   of	   debt	   depends	   on	   long-­‐term	   expectations	   about	   future	   interest	   rates,	  about	  the	  future	  growth	  rate	  of	  GDP	  and	  about	  primary	  surpluses	  that	  successive	  governments	  will	  run8.	  Finding	  reliable	  values	  for	  these	  variables	  to	  calculate	  the	  maximum	   solvency-­‐preserving	   level	   of	   debt	   is	   extremely	   difficult	   for	   two	  reasons.	  	  The	  lesser	  –	  technical	  –	  reason	  is	  that	  the	  formula	  requires	  gauging	  expectations	  about	   future	   variables,	   which	   are	   partly	   exogenous	   to	   the	   model,	   but	   partly	  determined	  within	  the	  model,	  so	  that	  change	  in	  one	  is	  likely	  to	  affect	  the	  others	  in	  destabilizing	  ways.	  The	   economic	   variables	  of	   interest	   and	  growth	   rates	   are	  dependent	   on	   forces	   exogenous	   to	   fiscal	   policy	   decisions	   –	   such	   as	   global	  monetary	   conditions,	   global	   business	   cycles	   and	   local	   structural	   factors	   –	   but	  also	  on	  the	  size	  of	  the	  debt	  itself9	  and,	  eventually,	  on	  markets’	  expectations	  about	  future	  surpluses	  and	  their	  compatibility	  with	  the	  solvency	  criterion.	  In	  the	  worst	  case,	  a	  changing	  appraisal	  of	  future	  primary	  balances	  can	  lead	  to	  an	  escalation	  of	  the	  risk	  premia	  and	  induce	  a	  self-­‐fulfilling	  solvency	  crisis	  by	  driving	  up	  interest	  rates	  to	  levels	  that	  are	  incompatible	  with	  existing	  primary	  balances,	  debt	  levels	  and	  growth	  rates10.	  Creditworthiness	  is	  thus	  subject	  to	  considerable	  uncertainty	  both	   from	  possible	  changes	   in	  exogenous	   factors	  and	  also	   from	  self-­‐reinforcing	  mechanisms	  within	  the	  model.	  	  	  The	  more	  important	  reason	  why	  the	  concept	  of	  solvency	  is	  an	  impracticable	  way	  of	  generating	  a	  benchmark	   for	   safe	  and	  unsafe	   levels	  of	  debt	   is	   the	  problem	  of	  understanding	   and	   predicting	   market	   sentiments	   about	   likely	   levels	   of	   future	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Formally,	  solvency	  is	  preserved	  if	  b≥(i-­‐g)*dmax	  where	  b	  is	  the	  expected	  long-­‐term	  average	  future	  primary	   surplus	   expressed	   as	   a	   percentage	   of	   GDP,	   i	   is	   the	   expected	   long-­‐term	   average	   future	  interest	   rate	  on	  outstanding	  debt,	  g	   is	   the	  expected	   long-­‐term	  average	  rate	  of	   future	  growth	  of	  GDP	  and	  dmax	  is	  the	  maximum	  debt	  at	  which	  solvency	  is	  still	  preserved,	  expressed	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  GDP	  (Buiter,	  2004)	  9	   Higher	   debt	   has	   been	   shown	   to	   be	   correlated	   with	   higher	   interest	   on	   average	   (Caselli	   et	   al	  1998),	  whereas	   it	  has	   also	  been	   indicated	   that	  debt	   levels	   above	  90	  percent	  of	   the	  GDP	   retard	  growth.	  (Reinhart	  et	  al.,	  2010,	  Kumar	  et	  al,	  2010)	  10	  Cohen	  and	  Portes	  (2004)	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primary	   surpluses.	   Primary	   surpluses	   –	   understood	   as	   the	   share	   of	   the	   total	  domestic	   product	   set	   aside	   by	   the	   sovereign	   for	   debt	   service	   –	   are	   limited	   by	  both	  economic	  and	  political	   factors.	  Economic	   factors	  determine	  the	  prosperity	  of	  a	  country	  and	  thereby	  circumscribe	   its	  ability	   to	  pay	  –	  assuming	  that	   from	  a	  larger	   income	   a	   higher	   proportion	   can	   be	   set	   aside	   for	   debt	   service.	   Political	  factors	   determine	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   the	   necessary	   surpluses	   are	   in	   fact	  mobilized	   to	   service	   debt	   and	   thereby	   indicate	   the	   sovereign’s	   willingness	   to	  pay11.	   The	   “sovereign’s	   willingness”	   to	   pay	   is	   possibly	   but	   not	   necessarily	  synonymous	  with	  the	  given	  government’s	  willingness	  to	  pay.	  The	  government’s	  cost-­‐benefit	   analysis	   might	   motivate	   it	   not	   to	   take	   the	   required	   fiscal	   policy	  measures	   to	  appropriate	   the	  necessary	  resources	   from	  citizens	   to	  service	  debt.	  However,	  it	  is	  also	  possible	  that	  the	  government	  is	  unable	  to	  raise	  the	  necessary	  taxes	  or	  make	  cuts	  in	  the	  face	  of	  societal	  resistance	  (which	  might	  manifest	  itself	  as	  mass	  tax	  evasion,	  instability	  of	  governments,	  vetoes	  by	  vested	  interests	  etc.).	  In	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  form	  expectations	  about	  future	  surpluses,	  markets	  need	  to	  assess	   both	   the	   ability	   and	   the	   willingness	   to	   pay.	   Evaluating	   the	   latter	  necessarily	  involves	  subjective	  mental	  models	  of	  how	  societies	  work	  and	  policies	  evolve.	   Therefore,	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   estimate	   this	   component	   of	   the	   theoretical	  benchmark.	  	  	  Figure	  1.	  gives	  an	  illustration	  of	  how	  the	  maximum	  levels	  of	  debt	  that	  respect	  the	  solvency	  criterion	  depend	  on	  primary	  surpluses	  (as	  a	  percentage	  of	  GDP)	  and	  on	  different	  long-­‐term	  future	  values	  of	  interest	  and	  GDP	  growth	  rates	  using	  a	  range	  of	   values	   possibly	   realistic	   for	   judging	   the	   maximum	   level	   of	   safe	   debt	   for	  developed	   countries.	   The	  upper	   end	   of	   the	   possible	   range	   for	   future	   surpluses	  goes	  up	  to	  eight	  percent,	  based	  on	  the	  argument	  that	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  why	  rich	  developed	   countries	   should	  not	  be	  able	   to	   set	   aside	   such	  a	   large	  proportion	  of	  their	   income	   (or	   even	   higher)	   for	   debt	   service	   without	   jeopardizing	   the	   basic	  welfare	  –	  health,	   safety,	   education	  –	  of	   their	  population.	   In	   recent	  decades,	   the	  highest	  primary	  surpluses	  sustained	  for	  a	  period	  of	  several	  decades	  by	  European	  countries	  were	  around	   four	   to	   five	  percent	  of	   the	  GDP12,	   but	   surpluses	  of	  over	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Buiter	  and	  Rahbari	  (2010)	  12	  	  In	  Belgium,	  Denmark,	  Finland	  or	  Ireland.	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nine	   percent	   of	   the	  GDP	   are	   not	   unprecedented	   either13.	   The	   lower	   end	   of	   the	  scale	  is	  at	  three	  percent,	  representing	  the	  fact	  that	  for	  most	  European	  countries,	  the	  actual	  primary	  surpluses	  in	  the	  past	  decades	  (pre-­‐crisis)	  were	  in	  much	  lower	  range	  than	  what	  they	  could	  theoretically	  afford.	  The	  two	  top	  lines	  correspond	  to	  the	  differential	  between	   interest	  and	  growth	  rates	  that	  characterised	  European	  countries	   in	   the	   past	   decades.	   Lower	   lines	   stand	   for	   considerably	   darker	  scenarios.	  	  	  
Figure	  1.	  –	  The	  maximum	  solvency-­preserving	  debt-­to-­GDP	  ratio	  as	  a	  function	  of	  credible	  
future	  primary	  surpluses	  
	  
	  The	   graph	   shows	   possible	   combinations	   of	   primary	   surplus	   ratios	   (horizontal	   axis)	  and	  maximum	  debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	  ratios	  (vertical	  axis)	  that	  satisfy	  the	  solvency	  criterion	  of	  b=(i-­‐g)dmax,	  assuming	  different	  values	  of	  interest	  and	  growth	  rates	  (i-­‐g).	  Based	   on	   the	   ability	   to	   pay	   and	   assuming	   that	   historic	   interest-­‐growth	   rate	  differentials	   persist,	   developed	   countries	   belong	   in	   the	   upper	   right-­‐hand	   quadrant.	  Doubts	  about	   the	  willingness	   to	  pay,	  however,	  would	  move	   them	  towards	   the	   lower	  left-­‐hand	  quadrant	  and	  onto	  lower	  lines,	  representing	  higher	  interest	  rates.	  	  The	   figure	   shows	   that,	   based	   on	   their	   theoretical	   capacity	   to	   pay	   (assuming	  historical	  interest-­‐	  and	  growth-­‐rate	  differentials)	  European	  economies	  should	  be	  able	  to	  sustain	  debts	  well	  beyond	  a	  hundred	  percent	  of	  their	  GDPs.	  However,	   if	  the	  markets’	  assessment	  of	  their	  willingness	  to	  pay	  was	  based	  on	  their	  past	  fiscal	  track	  record,	  their	  debt-­‐carrying	  capacity	  is	  in	  much	  lower	  ranges.	  Furthermore,	  if	  the	  confidence	  in	  the	  sovereign’s	  commitment	  to	  repay	  is	  weakened,	  the	  risk-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	   Denmark	   ran	   surpluses	   ranging	   from	   seven	   to	   twelve	   percent	   of	   the	   GDP	   throughout	   the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  eighties.	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premium	   component	   of	   the	   interest	   rates	   charged	   on	   its	   outstanding	   debt	   is	  likely	   to	   go	   up,	   further	   eroding	   its	   debt	   carrying	   capacity.	   Therefore,	  investigating	   the	   ways	   markets	   estimate	   the	   willingness	   to	   pay	   is	   crucial	   to	  getting	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  how	  much	  debt	  developed	  countries	  can	  safely	  carry.	   The	   next	   section	   enumerates	   possible	   approaches	   and	   the	   one	   after	   the	  next	   looks	   at	   the	   criteria	   that	   rating	   agencies	   apply	   in	   their	   sovereign	   credit	  rating	  practices.	  	  	  
Theoretical	  considerations	  about	  judging	  the	  willingness	  to	  pay	  	  The	  most	  straightforward	  method	  for	  judging	  future	  willingness	  to	  generate	  high	  enough	   primary	   surpluses	   to	   service	   debt	   is	   to	   look	   at	   past	   or	   present	  performance.	   The	   sustainability	   approach14	   looks	   at	   present	   performance.	   It	  investigates	   whether	   present	   (average)	   primary	   surpluses	   cover	   present	   debt	  service	  payments.	   If	   they	  do,	   fiscal	   policy	   is	   sustainable,	   the	   country	   is	   solvent	  and	  will	  stay	  so,	  because	  the	  debt	  load	  is	  not	  increasing.	  By	  running	  sustainable	  fiscal	  policies,	  the	  country	  is,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  demonstrating	  in	  the	  present	  that	  it	   can	   set	   aside	   resources	   in	   the	  necessary	   amount	   and	   (implicitly)	   guarantees	  that	  it	  will	  not	  need	  higher	  surpluses	  in	  the	  future,	  as	  its	  debt	  will	  not	  ratchet	  up.	  While	  sustainability	  analysis	   is	  a	  good	  way	  of	   judging	  present	  policies,	   it	   is	  not	  suitable	   for	   assessing	   the	   willingness	   to	   produce	   high	   enough	   surpluses	   to	  preserve	  solvency	   in	   the	   future.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	   the	  sustainability	  criterion	   is	  too	   strict:	   a	   country	  with	  presently	  unsustainable	  policies	  but	   a	   low	  debt	   level	  might	  be	  solvent	  if	  it	  changes	  its	  ways	  at	  a	  later	  point	  in	  time.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	   is	   too	   lenient:	   given	   the	   fact	   that	   exogenous	   changes	   in	   interest	   and	   growth	  rates	   could	   increase	   the	   required	   primary	   surpluses	   in	   the	   future,	   living	   up	   to	  today’s	  requirements	  is	  no	  guarantee	  that	  the	  country	  will	  be	  willing	  to	  pay	  if	  the	  costs	  of	  debt	  go	  up15.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Blanchard	  1990	  15	  Chalk	  and	  Hemming	  2000	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The	   dynamic	   version	   of	   the	   sustainability	   approach16	   corrects	   these	  shortcomings	  by	  shifting	  the	  emphasis	  from	  assessing	  the	  ability	  of	  fiscal	  policy	  to	  live	  up	  to	  the	  demands	  of	  debt	  servicing	  at	  any	  one	  point	  in	  time	  to	  the	  general	  ability	  to	  adjust	  policy	  to	  growing	  debt	  burden	  by	  responding	  to	  higher	  debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	  ratios	  with	  higher	  primary	  surpluses.	  Based	  on	  past	  ability	  to	  adjust,	  future	  ability	   to	  raise	  primary	  surpluses	   to	   the	  required	   levels	   to	  ensure	  solvency	  can	  be	   predicted.	   Ostry	   et.	   al	   use	   this	   approach	   to	   build	   an	   econometric	  model	   to	  predict	   –	   based	   on	   a	   country’s	   economic	   and	   political	   characteristics	   and	   past	  track	  record	  of	  adjustment	  –	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  given	  country	  will	  change	  its	  primary	   surplus	   in	   response	   to	   growth	   in	   debt17.	   They	   emphasize	   that	   since	  adjustment	   to	  debt	  growth	  cannot	  be	  uniform	  across	  all	   levels	  of	  debt	  –	  as	   the	  primary	  surplus	  cannot	  grow	  to	  accommodate	  ever	  higher	  debt	  without	  bound	  –	  this	  method	  also	  produces	  a	  way	  to	  gauge	  the	  maximum	  primary	  surplus	  that	  a	  country	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  willing	  and	  able	  to	  produce	  to	  service	  its	  debt.	  This	  ceiling	  on	   the	   willingness	   to	   pay	   defines	   the	   maximum	   level	   of	   debt	   a	   country	   can	  credibly	  commit	   to	  service	   in	   the	   future.	  This	  modelling	  approach	  goes	  beyond	  predicting	  future	  performance	  from	  past	  track	  record,	  since	  it	  also	  incorporates	  into	  its	  predictions	  certain	  structural	  characteristics	  of	  a	  given	  country	  –	  such	  as	  economic	   openness,	   age	   dependency,	   political	   stability	   –	   that	   are	   expected	   to	  influence	   both	   its	   ability	   and	   willingness	   to	   raise	   primary	   surpluses	  commensurate	  with	  debt18.	  	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   given	   the	   limited	   number	   of	   political	   variables	   that	   can	   be	  safely	  included	  in	  econometric	  modelling,	  the	  country	  specific	  fixed	  effects	  –	  i.e.	  the	  given	  country’s	  past	  track	  record	  in	  fiscal	  adjustment	  –	  are	  bound	  to	  have	  a	  fundamental	   effect	   on	   the	   predictions	   about	   its	   future	  willingness	   to	   pay.	   The	  predominance	  of	  this	  “track	  record”	  or	  “reputational”	  effect	  in	  modelling	  is	  likely	  to	   approximate	   quite	   well	   markets’	   approach	   to	   assessing	   willingness	   to	   pay.	  Reinhart	   at	   al.	   show	   that	   for	   developing	   countries	   the	   effect	   of	   past	   credit	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Bohn	  (1991,	  1995)	  17	  Ostry	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  18	  Their	  estimates	  for	  safe	  debt	  ceilings	  –	  based	  on	  backward	  looking	  data	  going	  back	  to	  1970	  and	  on	  forecasts	  of	  GDP	  growth	  rates	  and	  interest	  –	  range	  from	  around	  150	  percent	  of	  the	  GDP,	  up	  to	  250	  percent.	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servicing	  behaviour	  plays	  a	  crucial	  role	  and	  past	  defaults	  can	  create	  considerable	  “debt	   intolerance”	   –	   i.e.	   very	   low	   limits	   on	   the	   capacity	   to	   carry	   debt	   without	  default19.	  Even	  though	  developed	  countries	  do	  not	  have	  a	  history	  of	  past	  defaults,	  their	  past	  inability	  to	  adjust	  primary	  surpluses	  to	  a	  growing	  debt	  burden	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  a	  similar	  impact	  on	  market	  perceptions20.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  effect	  of	  past	  performance	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  deterministic	  on	   the	   assessment	   of	   future	   behaviour.	   In	   fact,	   markets	   seem	   to	   be	   quite	  receptive	  to	  sovereigns’	  signalling	  of	  their	  willingness	  to	  endure	  fiscal	  pain	  and	  thus	   to	   make	   the	   necessary	   adjustments	   in	   the	   future.	   Ardagna21	   shows	   that	  large	  fiscal	  consolidations	  are	  rewarded	  by	  immediate	  decreases	  in	  the	  yield	  on	  government	  debt,	  suggesting	  that	  a	  signal	  that	  there	  is	  willingness	  to	  correct	  past	  trajectories	   can	   restore	   market	   confidence.	   Furthermore,	   markets	   might	   also	  incorporate	  into	  their	  expectations	  –	  even	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  signal	  for	  a	  break	  in	   the	   policy	   trend	   –	   the	   experience	   that	   countries	   characterized	   by	   long-­‐standing	   fiscal	   imbalances	   often	   abruptly	   consolidate	   under	   pressure	   from	  imminent	  crisis22	  and	  therefore	  their	  future	  willingness	  to	  service	  debt	  is	   likely	  to	  be	  much	  higher	  than	  what	  is	  suggested	  by	  their	  track	  records23.	  	  	  The	  anticipation	  of	  one-­‐off	   sudden	  consolidations	   is	   likely	   to	  be	  based	  on	  cost-­‐benefit	  analyses	  of	  default	  that	  conclude	  that	  the	  given	  country	  has	  a	  lot	  to	  lose	  from	  not	  servicing	  its	  debt.	  For	  example,	  if	  interest	  rates	  are	  low	  and	  present	  day	  debt	   accumulation	   is	   driven	   by	   primary	   deficits,	   the	   country	   has	   a	   strong	  incentive	   not	   to	   default	   but	   gradually	   consolidate	   its	   finances,	   because	   default	  would	   temporarily	   shut	   it	   out	   of	   financial	   markets,	   radically	   increase	   its	  financing	  costs	  and	  decrease	  its	  debt	  tolerance	  for	  the	  future,	  while	  it	  would	  not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Reinhart	  et	  al.	  (2003)	  20	  This	  could	  explain,	   for	  example,	  why	  Greece	   fell	   into	  a	  debt	  crisis	  at	  a	  debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	  ratio	  that	  Belgium	  was	   easily	   able	   to	   sustain	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	  1990s,	   despite	   the	   fact	   that	   general	  interest	   rate	   conditions	   are	   much	   lighter	   now	   than	   they	   were	   then.	   Belgium	   has	   had	   a	   track	  record	  of	  making	  severe	  adjustments	  even	  in	  times	  of	  economic	  problems,	  whereas	  Greece	  was	  unwilling	  to	  rein	  in	  its	  public	  finances	  even	  at	  a	  time	  of	  economic	  prosperity.	  21	  Ardagna	  (2009)	  	  22	  The	  reasons	  behind	  such	  abrupt	  turnarounds	  are	  explained	  by	  Alesina	  and	  Drazen	  (1991)	  and	  Drazen	  and	  Grilli	  (1990)	  23	  Examples	  of	  such	  an	  abrupt	  turnaround	  include	  Italy,	  that	  improved	  its	  primary	  balance	  by	  7	  percentage	   points	   of	   the	   GDP	   within	   the	   course	   of	   six	   years,	   or	   Belgium	   that	   achieved	   an	  improvement	  of	  12	  percentage	  points	  of	  the	  GDP	  within	  eight	  years.	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eliminate	   the	  need	   to	   stabilize	   the	  primary	  balance.	   Similarly,	   if	   a	   large	  part	  of	  the	  public	  debt	  is	  held	  by	  domestic	  agents,	  the	  country	  is	  likelier	  to	  be	  interested	  in	  appropriating	   the	  necessary	   funds	   for	  debt	   servicing,	  because	  default	  would	  impose	   losses	   on	   the	   domestic	   constituencies.	   Lastly,	   default	   might	   harm	  domestic	   economic	   and	   political	   institutions	   and	   have	   long-­‐term	   costs	   for	   the	  economic	  health	  of	  the	  country24.	  	  A	   final	   set	   of	   considerations	   influencing	   the	   assessment	   of	   the	   willingness	   of	  sovereigns	   to	   generate	   high	   enough	   primary	   surpluses	   includes	   intangible,	  unquantifiable	   factors	   such	   as	   the	   level	   of	   social	   conflict,	   social	   norms	   about	  redistribution,	  the	  presence	  of	  vested	  interests,	  political	  structures	  and	  so	  on25.	  It	  is	   of	   course	   an	   immensely	   complicated	   question	   how	   exactly	   –	   through	   what	  mental	   models	   –	   such	   considerations	   might	   enter	   market	   perceptions	   of	  creditworthiness.	  It	  is	  probably	  a	  safe	  assumption	  that	  some	  of	  them	  form	  part	  of	  the	  more	  general	   “reputational”	   factor	  mentioned	  above.	  Others,	   especially	   the	  most	   “visible”	   problems	   such	   as	   government	   instability	   or	   widespread	   tax	  evasion	  could	  be	  explicitly	  considered	  in	  forecasting	  future	  surpluses.	  The	  way	  it	  is	  done	   in	  practice	  and	   the	  weight	  given	   to	  each	  of	   the	  above	  considerations	   is	  examined	  through	  a	  study	  of	  rating	  agencies	  methodologies	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  	  
Willingness-­to-­pay	  in	  sovereign	  ratings	  
	  Notwithstanding	   doubts	   about	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   rating	   agencies’	  pronouncements	   influence	   market	   behaviour,	   studying	   the	   way	   they	   evaluate	  creditworthiness	  and	  their	  explicit	  approach	  to	  assessing	  sovereigns’	  willingness	  to	   pay	   is	   likely	   to	   yield	   insights	   about	   how	  markets	   themselves	   conduct	   these	  assessments,	   because	   even	   if	   agencies	  were	   just	   following	   rather	   than	   leading	  market	   events26,	   they	   still	   have	   to	   rationalise	   their	   rating	   changes	   or	   the	   lack	  thereof	   by	   referring	   to	   factors	   influencing	   the	   ability	   and	   willingness	   of	  sovereigns	   to	   honour	   their	   debt	   commitments.	   If	   they	   are	   to	   retain	   their	  authority	  –	  which	  is	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  business	  success	  –	  their	  reasons	  for	  rating	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  See	  Cottarelli	  et	  al	  2010	  and	  Buiter	  and	  Rahbari	  (2010)	  25	  See	  Buiter	  and	  Rahbari	  (2010)	  26	  	  Which	  is	  not	  necessarily	  always	  true,	  as	  the	  Greek	  events	  of	  April	  2010	  show.	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actions	  need	  to	  be	  broadly	  in	  line	  with	  the	  assessment	  of	  other	  market	  actors.	  By	  publishing	   their	   rating	   methodologies,	   they	   recognise	   as	   valid	   a	   range	   of	  considerations	   to	   be	   taken	   in	   judging	   sovereign	   creditworthiness.	   This	   section	  reviews	  the	  sovereign	  rating	  methodologies	  of	  Moody’s,	  Standard	  and	  Poor’s	  and	  Fitch	  to	  see	  how	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  above	  mentioned	  aspects	  feature	  in	  the	  agencies’	  approach	  towards	  assessing	  willingness	  to	  pay	  and	  draws	  on	  examples	  in	  which	  specific	  considerations	  played	  central	  role	  in	  rating	  actions	  in	  the	  recent	  past.	  	  	  First	  of	  all,	   it	   is	   important	  to	  point	  out	  that	  all	  agencies	  explicitly	  underline	  the	  importance	  of	  evaluating	  countries	  willingness,	  not	  just	  their	  capacity	  to	  pay.	  As	  expected,	  countries’	  present	   fiscal	  policies	  and	  track	  record	  plays	  an	   important	  part	   in	   assessing	   their	   future	   ability	   to	   run	   surpluses,	   but	  with	   great	   variance	  across	   agencies.	   S&P	   draws	   an	   especially	   strong	   link	   between	   an	   observed	  practice	   of	   unsustainable	   policies	   and	   the	   lack	   of	   willingness	   to	   pay27,	   and	  emphasizes	   the	   significance	   of	   demonstrated	   effort	   to	   deal	   with	   existing	  imbalances	   and	   of	   signalling	   the	  willingness	   to	   attack	   existing	   problems	   head-­‐on28.	  Fitch	  mentions	  the	  role	  of	  a	  proven	  record	  of	  paying	  up	  on	  time	  and	  in	  full,	  but	  qualifies	   its	   importance29.	   It	  also	  talks	  about	  the	  importance	  of	   longer-­‐term	  sustainability,	   but	   focuses	   on	   the	   need	   for	   a	   credible	   commitment	   to	   restore	  sustainability,	   rather	   than	   on	   the	   present	   degree	   of	   sustainability	   of	   policies30.	  Moody’s	  does	  not	  explicitly	  address	   this	   issue.	  Several	   rating	  actions	  exemplify	  this	  divergence	  in	  opinion	  about	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  good	  or	  an	  improving	  track	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	   “A	   government	   that	   is	   unwilling	   to	   repay	   debt	   is	   usually	   pursuing	   economic	   policies	   that	  weaken	  its	  ability	  to	  do	  so.”	  (p4,	  S&P	  2008)	  28	   “A	   strong	   policy	   response	   that	   identifies	   and	   addresses	   sources	   of	   instability	   is	   key	   to	  maintaining	  credit	  quality	  in	  the	  face	  of	  negative	  shocks	  or	  trends.	  […]	  a	  robust	  policy	  response	  is	  crucial	  for	  strengthening	  both	  the	  economic	  environment	  and	  sovereign	  creditworthiness.	  ”	  (p17,	  S&P	  2008)	  29	  “Payment	  record	  is	  the	  most	  visible,	  albeit	  backward-­‐looking,	  indicator	  of	  willingness	  to	  pay…	  [T]he	  influence	  on	  the	  rating	  of	  even	  recent	  episodes	  of	  default	  will	  be	  greatly	  moderated	  if	  it	  is	  judged	  that	  the	  default	  is	  not	  symptomatic	  of	  a	  continuing	  weakness	  in	  the	  political	  capacity	  and	  will	   of	   the	   sovereign	   authorities	   to	  mobilize	   resources	   to	   honour	   debt	   obligations.”	   (p9,	   Fitch	  2009)	  30	  “The	  sustainability	  of	  a	  given	  level	  of	  government	  debt	  is	  also	  a	  function	  of	  its	  path	  over	  time.	  If	   there	   is	   weak	   credibility	   that	   fiscal	   policies	   will	   be	   sufficient	   to	   adjust	   the	   primary	   budget	  balance	  (ie	  the	  budget	  balance	  excluding	  net	  interest	  payments)	  to	  establish	  and	  sustain	  the	  debt	  ratio	   on	   a	   downward	   path	   over	   the	   medium	   to	   long	   term,	   the	   long-­‐run	   solvency	   of	   the	  government	  will	  also	  be	  under	  pressure.”(p13,	  Fitch	  2009)	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record.	  In	  2004,	  when	  Greece	  was	  downgraded	  by	  both	  S&P	  and	  Fitch,	  the	  press	  releases	   of	   the	   rating	   decisions	   cited	   as	   a	   reason	   the	   country’s	   reversal	   to	   its	  earlier,	  inferior	  fiscal	  habits	  after	  a	  short	  period	  of	  consolidation	  that	  had	  led	  to	  successive	   upgrades.	   In	   2005,	   S&P	   downgraded	   Portugal	   due	   to	   worse-­‐than-­‐expected	   fiscal	   results,	   but	   Fitch,	   after	   having	   put	   the	   country	   on	   a	   negative	  outlook,	   consequently	   confirmed	   the	   old	   rating,	   arguing	   that	   Portugal’s	   new	  budget	  signalled	  credible	  commitment	   to	  stabilize	  public	   finances.	   Importantly,	  Moody’s	  did	  not	  act	  upon	  the	  new	  fiscal	  developments	  and	  data	  in	  either	  of	  the	  cases.	  	  	  The	  three	  agencies	  also	  show	  considerable	  difference	  in	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  they	  believe	  that	  the	  structural	  characteristics	  of	  present	  fiscal	  policies	  determine	  the	  future	  willingness	   of	   the	   sovereign	   to	   generate	   surpluses.	   S&P	   takes	   the	  most	  conservative	   approach	   by	   considering,	   for	   example,	   pension	   obligations	   as	   a	  serious	  threat	  to	  future	  balances	  that	  need	  to	  be	  tackled	  in	  order	  to	  retain	  high	  ratings31.	  For	   instance,	   in	   its	   justification	  for	  Italy’s	  downgrade	  in	  2006,	   it	  cited	  as	   one	   of	   the	  most	   important	   reasons,	   the	   country’s	   failure	   to	   deal	  with	   rising	  pension	  expenditure.	  Fitch	  also	  argues	   for	   the	  need	   to	  keep	  an	  eye	  on	  pension	  liabilities,	   although	   it	   does	   not	   specify	   the	   implications	   for	   rating	   scores32.	  Moody’s	  takes	  a	  far	  more	  relaxed	  approach,	  arguing	  that	  policies	  should	  only	  be	  incorporated	   into	   ratings	   when	   they	   are	   put	   into	   practice	   –	   i.e.	   the	   present	  pension	  policy	  can	  be	  reformed	  before	  the	  real	  effects	  of	  population	  aging	  kick	  in	  and	  therefore,	  the	  possible	  future	  expansion	  of	  pension	  expenditure	  should	  not	  put	  pressure	  on	  present	  ratings33.	  	  In	  general,	  while	  Moody’s	  attaches	  much	  less	  importance	   to	   present	   fiscal	   performance	   and	   structures,	   it	   seems	   to	   put	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	   “Pension	   obligations	   represent	   a	   fiscal	   pressure	   of	   growing	   significance	   for	   countries	   with	  rapidly	  aging	  populations.	  Standard	  &	  Poor's	  believes	  that	  the	  credit	  ratings	  of	  some	  highly	  rated	  sovereigns	  could	  begin	  to	  come	  under	  downward	  pressure	  over	  the	  medium	  term	  if	  there	  is	  no	  further	   fiscal	   consolidation	   and	   structural	   reform	   to	   counter	   the	   financial	   problems	   of	   aging	  societies.“	  (p10,	  S&P	  2008)	  32	  “Unfunded	  pension	  liabilities	  will	  be	  considered	  in	  periodic	  reviews	  of	  medium-­‐	  and	  long-­‐term	  sustainability	   of	   public	   finances	   if	   official	   projections	   (either	   by	   the	   government	   or	   an	  internationally	  recognised	  institution	  such	  as	  the	  OECD)	  imply	  that	  such	  liabilities	  are	  material“	  33	   “[W]e	   take	   into	  account	   implicit	   liabilities	   such	  as	  public	  pension	   system	  deficits	  only	   to	   the	  extent	   that	   they	  will	  materialize	   into	   an	   actual	   debt	   or	   payment	   obligation;	   governments	   have	  many	  ways	   to	   alter	   the	   net	   present	   value	   of	   pension	   liabilities,	   such	   as	   postponing	   retirement	  age,	  increasing	  contributions	  and	  lowering	  pensions.“	  (p12,	  Moody’s	  2008)	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greatest	   emphasis	  on	   the	   capacity	   to	  adjust	   to	  new	  circumstances	   from	  among	  the	  three	  agencies34.	  	  As	  far	  as	  the	  intangible,	  political	  aspects	  of	  creditworthiness	  are	  concerned,	  the	  rating	   methodologies	   reveal	   interesting	   differences	   in	   the	   different	   agencies’	  approaches.	  All	  three	  engage	  with	  the	  characteristics	  of	  political	  institutions	  and	  stress	   their	  crucial	   importance	   in	  determining	   future	  willingness	   to	  service	   the	  debt.	   However,	   while	   Moody’s	   only	   cites	   general,	   explicitly	   non-­‐normative35	  features	   of	   political	   systems	   that	   prop	   up	   compliance	   with	   debt	   obligations	   –	  such	   as	   respect	   of	   property	   rights,	   predictability	   of	   government,	   policy	   or	  transparency	   –	   S&P	   lists	   quite	   normative	   requirements	   for	   the	   credibility	   of	   a	  sovereign	  to	  pay,	  ranging	  from	  the	  separation	  of	  powers,	  independent	  judiciary,	  civil	   institutions	   to	   the	   independence	   of	   the	   press36.	   Criteria	   used	   by	   Fitch	   are	  generally	  more	  neutral37.	  	  	  While	   changes	   of	   these	   institutional	   factors	   are	   unlikely	   to	   elicit	   rating	  adjustments	   in	   the	   case	   of	   most	   developed	   countries38,	   other	   socio-­‐political	  factors	   are	   likely	   to	   play	   a	  more	   important	   role.	   All	   three	   agencies	   emphasize	  that	  deep	  divisions	  within	  society	  and	  among	  political	  groups,	  conflict	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  consensus	  on	  the	  structure	  of	  policies	  and	  or	  redistribution	  are	  a	  major	  threat	  to	  creditworthiness39.	  Fitch	  also	  calls	  attention	  to	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  presence	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  p13,	  Moody’s	  2009	  35	   „Monitoring	   “institutional	   strength”	   does	   not	   entail	   a	   value	   judgment	   about	   the	   type	   of	  government	  in	  any	  given	  country	  –	  democracies	  as	  well	  as	  autocracies	  or	  other	  political	  regimes	  default	  alike.	  Rather,	  this	  assessment	  constitutes	  an	  informed	  opinion	  about	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  governance	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  certain	  situations	  can	  degenerate	  into	  credit	  disruptions	  at	  times	  of	  stress.“	  p8,	  Moodys	  2008	  36	  p7,	  S&P	  2008	  37	   Rule	   of	   law	   and	   respect	   for	   property	   rights	   provide	   confidence	   that	   political	   (and	   civil)	  institutions	   have	   a	   strong	   commitment	   to	   honouring	   financial	   obligations.	   Political	   risk	   factors	  relevant	   to	   sovereign	   creditworthiness	   include	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   the	   political	   regime;	   the	  effectiveness	   of	   government	   (in	   terms	   of	   the	   formulation,	   implementation	   and	   credibility	   of	  policy);	   control	   of	   corruption;	   and	   an	   assessment	   of	   the	   likelihood	   of	   severe	   civil	   conflict	   and	  “war	   risk”’.	   	  (p9	  Fitch	  2009)	  38	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  two-­‐notch	  downgrade	  of	  Hungary	  at	  the	  end	  of	  2010	  by	  all	  three	  agencies	  might	  have	  had	  to	  do	  with	  the	  country’s	  decisions	  to	  curtail	  the	  freedom	  of	  the	  press,	   to	   levy	  a	   large	  extraordinary	  tax	  on	  multinational	  enterprises	  and	  to	  nationalise	  pension	  savings	  in	  private	  pension	  funds,	  even	  though	  these	  issues	  were	  not	  explicitly	  stated	  in	  the	  press	  releases.	  39	   “	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  sovereign	  risk,	  what	  matters	   is	  [...]	   the	  degree	  of	  consensus	  on	  the	  key	  goals	  of	  political	  action	  –	  are	  conducive	  to	  honoring	  contracts.	  The	  last	  point	  is	  particularly	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or	  absence	  of	  vested	  interests40,	  whereas	  S&P	  discusses	  the	  importance	  of	  having	  large	  constituencies	  with	  strong	  interest	  in	  debt	  repayment	  and	  in	  financial	  and	  monetary	   stability,	   influencing	   the	   calculus	   of	  making	   efforts	   to	   service	   debt41.	  The	  presence	  or	  intensification	  of	  disruptive	  political	  tensions	  has	  often	  been	  the	  reason	   given	   for	   downgrades.	   Most	   recently,	   the	   Flemish-­‐Walloon	   conflict	   has	  caused	   S&P	   to	   threaten	   Belgium	   with	   a	   downgrade.	   Previously,	   Italy	   was	  downgraded	  in	  2006	  because	  of	  the	  government’s	  inability	  to	  assert	  authority	  or	  cobble	  together	  a	  social	  coalition	  to	  solve	  contentious	  issues.	  	  	  Finally,	  S&P	  –	  alone	  among	  the	  three	  agencies	  –	  brings	  up	  an	  important	  political	  factor	  embedded	   in	  current	   fiscal	  policy	  choices.	   It	  asserts	   that	  since	  countries’	  administrative	  and	  socio-­‐political	  ability	  to	  flexibly	  adapt	  to	  increased	  demands	  on	  public	  finances	  strongly	  depends	  on	  the	  specific	  characteristics	  and	  content	  of	  taxation	  and	  spending,	  these	  specificities	  also	  need	  to	  form	  part	  of	  the	  appraisal	  of	  the	  given	  country’s	  future	  ability	  to	  pay,	  beyond	  judging	  their	  effect	  on	  overall	  balance	  of	  public	  finances.	  It	  claims	  that	  broad-­‐based	  tax	  systems	  characterized	  by	   low	   rates	   are	   superior	   because	   they	   provide	   more	   redistributive	   equity,	   a	  more	  growth-­‐friendly	  economic	  environment	  and	  a	  flexible	  adaptability	  of	  rates	  and	  bases.	  It	  also	  implies	  that	  some	  forms	  of	  public	  spending	  are	  more	  effective	  than	  others	   and	   evaluating	   spending	   effectiveness	   should	  be	  part	   of	   the	   rating	  process42.	  In	  other	  words	  it	  contends	  that	  the	  assessment	  of	  creditworthiness	  of	  countries	   needs	   to	   involve	   the	   evaluation	   of	   these	   quintessentially	   political	  policy	  choices,	  possibly	  independently	  of	  their	  effect	  on	  present	  public	  finances.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  important:	  adjustment	  efforts	  such	  as	  raising	  taxes	  or	  cutting	  public	  expenditures	  will	  be	  easier	  in	  countries	  that	  exhibit	  a	  high	  level	  of	  political	  consensus.”	  (p8,	  Moody’s	  2008)	  “Standard	   &	   Poor's	   examines	   the	   degree	   to	  which	   politics	   is	   adversarial	   and	   the	   frequency	   of	  changes	  in	  government,	  as	  well	  as	  any	  public	  security	  concerns.”	  (p7,	  S&P	  2008)	  40	  “Political	  and	  social	  tensions	  can	  have	  an	  important	  bearing	  on	  sovereign	  creditworthiness.	  A	  high	   degree	   of	   consensus	   on	   major	   social	   and	   economic	   issues	   is	   associated	   with	   stable	   and	  predictable	  economic	  policies.	   	   [...]	  Account	   is	  also	   taken	  of	  powerful	  vested	   interests	   that	  may	  block	  essential	  structural	  reforms.	  “	  (p9	  Fitch	  2009)	  41	  “A	  sovereign	  has	  fewer	  incentives	  to	  default	  on	  local	  currency	  obligations	  when	  they	  are	  held	  by	   a	   broad	   cross-­‐section	   of	   domestic	   investors	   [...]	   [E]ven	   when	   public	   debt	   is	   high,	  creditworthiness	   can	   be	   sustained	   over	   long	   periods	   when	   policymakers	   are	   responsive	   to	  constituencies	  with	   vested	   interests	   in	   safeguarding	   the	   internal	   value	   of	  money	   and	   financial	  contracts“	  (p12,	  S&P	  2008)	  42	  P9,	  S&P	  2008.	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Conclusion	  	  This	   paper	   has	   shed	   light	   on	   important	   political	   aspects	   of	   sovereign	  creditworthiness	   and	   argued	   that	   these	   are	   currently	   likely	   to	   have	   greater	  significance	  on	  the	  debt	  carrying	  capacity	  of	  developed	  countries	  than	  economic	  ones.	   It	   presented	   an	   array	   of	   political	   considerations	   –	   ranging	   from	  institutional	   and	   socio-­‐political	   factors	   to	   politically	   charged	  policy	   decisions	   –	  that	   enter	   the	   decision	   making	   process	   of	   rating	   agencies	   and	   possibly	   other	  market	   agents.	   Given	   the	   sudden	   nervousness	   of	   markets	   about	   developed	  countries’	   creditworthiness,	   is	   the	   political	   and	   policy	   diversity	   of	   these	  countries	   come	   under	   pressure?	   Alternatively,	   are	   certain	   political	  characteristics	   and	   politically	   charged	   policy	   choices	   going	   to	   threaten	   the	  financial	   stability	  of	  developed	  states?	   In	  2004,	  Layna	  Mosley	  wrote:	   “Investors	  
assume	  that	  OECD	  governments	  will	  repay	  their	  debts,	   leaving	  these	  governments	  
with	   measurable	   policy	   autonomy.	   Governments	   of	   developed	   countries	   that	  
conform	   to	   capital	   market	   pressures	   in	   certain	   macro-­policy	   areas,	   particularly	  
overall	  inflation	  and	  government	  budget	  balances,	  are	  relatively	  unconstrained	  in	  
supply-­side	  policies.43”	  Is	  this	  blissful	  freedom	  of	  choice	  now	  over?	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